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Executive Summary
• Until 2013, the International Security and 
Stabilisation Support Strategy in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo focused mainly on infra-
structure and the training and deployment of 
police officers. This did not result in more stabi-
lity. The strategy has been criticised for providing 
technical solutions to political problems. The 
revised strategy engages communities and aut-
horities at local and national level in dialogues in 
order to identify causes and develop solutions to 
conflicts. It provides the first coherent and tho-
rough approach to stabilisation in DRC, an exit 
strategy for MONUSCO and an opportunity for 
learning for other UN operations. 
Key recommendations 
 • UN missions should move away from a top 
down stabilisation approach focusing mainly 
on military response, infrastructure support 
and presence of state officials and instead 
involve communities and authorities affected 
by conflict in identifying the roots and solu-
tions to conflict. Donors should prioritise  
funding for programmes that are in line with 
this approach, either bilaterally or through 
mechanisms such as the Stabilisation 
Coherence Fund.1
 • A dialogue-based approach to stabilisation  
is demanding in terms of time and resources. 
It must be the responsibility of the entire  
mission to implement the strategy. 
1 See website for the Stabilisation Coherence Fund with overview 
of funding commitments: http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/
fund/CDS00
 • The ISSSS represents an exit strategy for 
MONUSCO. As such, the UN Country Team  
can take the lead in coordination of the ISSSS 
when MONUSCO exits. The longer-term  
solutions for stabilisation in eastern DRC  
will need support from both development  
and humanitarian actors.
 • Operationalising stabilisation strategies 
requires context knowledge of the underlying 
driving factors for conflict and good conflict-
reducing initiatives in the area of operation. 
Stabilisation missions in Mali, the Central 
African Republic and Somalia need to adapt 
strategies based on a thorough understanding 
of why armed groups fight in the first place 
and of which community and dialogue struc-
tures already exist and can be supported.
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2. “Clear, hold, build”: The first phase of 
MONUSCO’s stabilisation strategy
• MONUSCO’s experience with stabilisation has 
clearly shown that there are few quick fixes and 
no one-size fits all format. This also corresponds 
well with relevant external evaluations and 
research findings.3 MONUSCO has been criticised 
for trying to resolve deeply entrenched political 
challenges through technical interventions based 
on a “clear, hold, build” approach. MONUSCO’s 
stabilisation efforts in the first phase after it 
received a stabilisation mandate, mainly involved 
the construction of roads and government  
buildings and training and deployment of state 
officials, such as the police. 
While this is sorely needed, the interventions 
have failed to address the root causes of the con-
flicts. For example, in order to secure livelihoods, 
communities may be forced to turn to violence or 
3 See e.g.  Severine Autesserre (2015). “Peaceland: Conflict 
Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International 
Intervention” and International Alert (2015). “Beyond 
Stabilisation: Understanding the conflict dynamics in North 
and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo.” 
support armed groups. Also, state agents often 
do not serve the interest of the population.4 
“Restoration of state authorities” was largely 
interpreted as placing more police stations or 
FARDC soldiers in a given conflict area, without 
considering how the police and FARDC networks 
contribute to conflict escalation. Moreover, 
MONUSCO took largely a top-down approach 
to the (at times uninterested) political elite.  
The $367 million spent on stabilisation interven-
tions between 2009–2012, when stabilisation 
was introduced in the mission’s mandate, did not 
lead to increased stability. The mission and the 
international community – together with the DRC 
national authorities – acknowledged that a shift 
was urgently needed in order to build stability 
and accountable political institutions. 
4 Hugo de Vries (2015). “Going around in circles: The challenges 
of peacekeeping and stabilization in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo”. Haag: Clingendael. 
1. Introduction 
• Though largely absent from the headlines,  
the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
is still marked by conflict. The defeat of the M23 
armed group and the February 2013 signing of 
the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework 
(PSCF) agreement raised hopes that stability was 
within reach for the war-torn region. However, 
progress and reform has yet again stagnated, 
leaving the population disillusioned and at times 
even aggressive towards the international com-
munity and the UN peacekeeping mission 
(MONUSCO) present in the country.
In fact, after almost twenty years of war and 
insecurity, the conflict in the DRC is becoming 
increasingly more entrenched and complex. This 
period coincides with the presence of MONUSCO, 
the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission. The mis-
sion arrived in DRC in 1999 as MONUC and has 
had a mandate to stabilise the eastern region 
since 2009. 
A recent report confirms that the DRC is now 
hosting over seventy armed groups; a doubling 
since the last estimate in 2014.2 While this does 
not necessarily signify an increase in combatants, 
it demonstrates the military, political and eco-
nomic fragmentation in eastern DRC. The mobili-
sation of smaller armed groups is becoming a way 
of life for politicians, the business elite and local 
authorities to gain political and economic power 
regionally, locally and privately. The strategies of 
the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) – in coop-
eration with MONUSCO – are making the conflicts 
increasingly more entangled. The policy to inte-
grate higher-ranking members of armed groups 
into the FARDC has left armed group combatants 
seeking other commanders and even created a 
certain incentive to continue fighting. At the same 
time there has been no real demilitarisation and 
reintegration programme. This shows that military 
approaches can contribute to an increase rather 
than a decrease of violence and conflict. 
2 Jason Stearns & Christoph Vogel (December 2015) 
“Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in the Eastern 
Congo”. London/Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute
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3. Addressing root causes of conflict:  
The revised International Security and 
Stabilisation Support Strategy
• The UN Security Council in 2012 requested 
a strategic review of the implementation of the 
International Security and Stabilisation Support 
Strategy (ISSSS), led by the Stabilisation Support 
Unit (SSU) in MONUSCO with support and input 
from the Congolese government and internatio-
nal donors. This resulted in the revised ISSSS 
2013–2017 that aspires to target root causes 
to conflicts and identify strategic points of inter-
vention. The revised ISSSS is the main framework 
for harmonising the international community´s 
efforts to support the Government of DRC´s 
Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War 
Affected Areas (STAREC).5 
It is important to emphasise that the ISSSS is the 
international community’s strategy to stabilise 
the east of the DRC, it is not owned by MONUSCO 
alone. Further, it is a strategy that has been 
developed in close cooperation with the 
Congolese authorities (STAREC) and the civil 
society.  The strategy6 defines stabilisation as 
“an integrated, holistic but targeted process  
of enabling state and society to build mutual 
accounta bility and capacity to address and  
mitigate existing or emerging drivers of violent 
conflict, creating the conditions for improved 
governance and longer term development.”7
4 Hugo de Vries (2015). “Going around in circles: The challenges 
of peacekeeping and stabilization in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo”. Haag: Clingendael.
5 Adopted in 2009, and revised in 2013. The revised version 
was approved by the Congolese Government and international 
donors 29 June 2012. Ref : ISSSS 2013–2017. 
6 For the revised strategy in full, see: http://www.unpbf.org/
wp-content/uploads/ISSSS-2013-2017-Strategic-Framework-
FINAL_EN.pdf
7 ISSSS 2013-2017. “International Security and Stabilisation 
Support Strategy 2013-2017: Executive Summary”.  
Goma: Stabilisation Support Unit, MONUSCO. 
Acknowledging that previous responses to stabi-
lisation have been too technical and incapable of 
addressing key political dimensions of the con-
flicts, the new ISSSS programmes have “demo-
cratic dialogue” as the underlying mechanism of 
all programming.8 Representatives from all parts 
of the community are invited to identify local 
causes and solutions to conflicts. This includes 
stakeholders often termed “spoilers.” The activi-
ties do not start before a participatory conflict 
analysis is carried out. If dialogue initia tives 
already exist, ISSSS programmes aspire to build 
on these rather than construct yet another 
structure. 
These dialogues are intended to enable women, 
girls, boys and men in conflict affected commu-
nities, traditional authorities and state represen-
tatives to play a key role in transforming the 
wider conflict environment into a mutually acco-
untable society for the longer term. Through the 
dialogue mechanisms, local actors are able to 
participate in and influence political processes 
involving the Congolese government and the 
international community, including MONUSCO. 
As such, not only are the solutions owned and 
monitored by the communities themselves, but 
they also include the first steps towards (re-) 
establishing a social contract between elected 
authorities and their constituents. 
8 Democratic dialogue is here understood as “…a democratic 
method aimed at resolving problems through mutual 
understanding and concessions, rather than through unilateral 
impositions of one side’s views and interests.” Pruitt B and 
Thomas P; “Democratic Dialogue – a Handbook for 
practitioners,” International IDEA and UNDP (2007).
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Building on the findings and recommendations 
identified in the democratic dialogues, activities 
are implemented by national and international 
NGOs with a long-term experience in the DRC 
and UN agencies. Activities can include econo-
mic recovery for at risk groups and enabling pub-
lic servants to deliver quality services. They also 
incorporates measures to improve and sustain 
mutual trust between the community members 
and state authorities, which will limit the need  
to fall back on ethnic dimensions or violent  
solutions to community conflicts. 
The community dialogues will not be carried out 
by MONUSCO. For example, in Kalehe, South Kivu, 
a national organisation with a long history work-
ing with community dialogues and mediation 
is the implementing partner in the ISSSS pro-
gramme.9 They have the skills and the contextual 
knowledge to navigate in a conflict terrain that 
MONUSCO does not have. At the same time, 
MONUSCO has logistic support and access to the 
political authorities that the local communities 
and the national organisations do not have. 
In Kalehe, the Congolese partner together with 
the local communities set up and trained media-
tion committees, and facilitated community dia-
logues.  Community representatives created an 
action plan for what is needed to bring stability. 
Some of the action points can be resolved at  
the community level, whereas others must be 
addressed at a higher political level. MONUSCO 
and STAREC organised a visit where community 
representatives had an opportunity to discuss 
their concerns with the government officials. 
9 The partner, “Action pour la Paix et la Concorde” (APC), has a 
longtime partnership with Life & Peace Institute and is also a 
key actor in the peacebuilding domain in the DRC.
Specifically, the competing claims over land by 
two communities was identified as the root cause 
of a number of conflicts in the area. The commu-
nity leaders demanded government support in 
deciding who had the legal right to this land. 
While the government officials communicated 
the concern through their hierarchy, MONUSCO 
supported the process through its means.  The 
village in question is in an area without road 
access and the communities are isolated from 
decision-makers. MONUSCO provided logistics to 
facilitate the visit. Importantly, this was the first 
time the government at the provincial level had 
ever visited these communities. 
The revised ISSSS is still in the implementation 
phase and it is too early to conclude as to its 
effectiveness. One might say that its bottom-up 
approach and community centred solutions  
represents nothing new and that peacebuilding 
organisations have been doing this for decades 
with proven results.10  The innovation of the 
revised ISSSS strategy is that it represents  
the first coherent and thorough international 
strategy on stabilisation for the region.  The  
complexity of the DRC conflicts requires a 
response that takes into account all levels of  
the conflict. This might include addressing issues 
of poverty, ethnic discrimination and gender 
relations – an overwhelming task for one NGO.
MONUSCO, being such a large actor and having 
access to the political leadership in DRC, could 
make a real difference to people living in the 
midst of conflict- if the mission fully adopted  
the approaches outlined in the strategy.11 This 
has yet to happen. While the donors, provincial 
governments and NGOs are rallying behind the 
strategy, MONUSCO is criticised for not seriously 
engaging with it.12  
10 There is a growing literature on the subject of dialogue. A good 
data base with publications relevant to this body of practice is 
available under “Democratic Dialogue Documents” in the 
learning library at http://www.democraticdialoguenetwork.
org/app/section/view/en/library 
11 This is in line with the recommendation of the High-level 
Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations, the so-called 
“ HIPPO report”: http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_
June_2015.pdf 
12 Hugo de Vries (2016). “The Ebb and Flow of Stabilisation in 
the Congo”. London/Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute. 
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4. Challenges and opportunities for  
the new approach to stabilisation
• There is a duality in MONUSCO’s mandate; a 
friction between fighting armed groups, some-
times resulting in further instability and fragmen-
tation, and addressing the reasons why armed 
groups and self-defence groups are created in 
the first place. The idea that stabilisation must 
result from initiatives coming from within the 
societies themselves is not widely understood  
or practiced in MONUSCO. In theory, the ISSSS 
strategy should be underpinning the work of the 
entire mission. The SSU is mandated to coordi-
nate the stabilisation efforts of the mission. 
However, SSU staff experience that the responsi-
bility to implement the stabilisation efforts is left 
to the unit, a rather overwhelming task for a 
team of approximately 15 staff. Bringing the 
whole mission behind the revised strategy is one 
of the key challenges that must be overcome to 
ensure maximum impact of the strategy. Other 
challenges are whether Congolese authorities  
are willing to change the conflict dynamics, the 
need for targeted funding such as through the 
Stabilisation Coherence Fund, and coordinating 
different international and local actors in sup-
porting implementation of ISSSS programmes.
However, there are a number of opportunities for 
MONUSCO if its leadership seriously engages 
with the revised ISSSS. First, the strategy repre-
sents the most important opportunity to a cohe-
rent approach to stabilisation in the eastern DRC. 
The operationalisation of the ISSSS would be a 
response to the growing criticism of MONUSCO 
regarding a lack of community involvement and 
context understanding.13 
13 See, for example, Severine Autesserre (06.10.2015), “Trouble 
in Peaceland”. Foreign Policy.
Second, ISSSS can also be an important  
component of an exit strategy for MONUSCO. 
After more than 15 years of operation, there is 
considerable pressure from the DRC government 
for MONUSCO to withdraw. If MONUSCO succeeds 
in operationalising the ISSSS, it can play an  
integral part in a sustainable exit strategy for  
the mission. The UN country team (UNCT) can 
play a crucial role in ensuring a sound transition 
when MONUSCO eventually pulls out. Thus, the 
UNCT have to be involved in the drafting of the 
exit strategy.
Third, the ISSSS can demonstrate how the rec-
ommendations from the High-Level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations report can be opera-
tionalised.14 A successful implementation would 
provide valuable lessons for other stabilisation 
missions, such as in Mali, the Central African 
Republic and Somalia, on how to integrate bot-
tom-up approaches and community led initia-
tives within a peacekeeping structure. As such, 
the ISSSS can also play a role in informing the 
reform process of the UN Department of Peace 
Keeping Operations. 
14  See full report: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, 
partnership and people (June 2015), http://www.un.org/sg/
pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf
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5. Conclusion
• Stabilisation under the new ISSSS framework 
does not mean using all necessary military 
means to end armed conflicts, as the armed 
groups in the eastern DRC are often engrained in 
the communities where they reside. An exclusive 
military response increases rather than reduces 
conflicts in the region and consequently makes 
them intrinsically more complex, as the increase 
in armed groups in the DRC clearly demonstrates. 
Neither does the new approach to stabilisation 
mean bringing stability mainly by increasing  
the physical presence of state authorities. The 
communities themselves need to be involved  
in finding solutions together with the elected 
politicians and with the coordinated support  
of international actors. 
This paper has argued that the revised ISSSS 
strategy provides a great opportunity for  
encouraging trust and accountability between 
Congolese citizens and official and traditional 
authorities to resolve some of the protracted 
conflicts reigning in the DRC today. It also  
presents an opportunity to show the way for 
other UN missions tasked to stabilise other  
complex conflict areas. 
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